Abstract-Some of the important characteristics of services environments are being dynamic, distributed, loosely coupled and open. These characteristics result in the existence of different levels of functional and non-functional properties of the services operating in such environments. Consequently, it creates challenges for interacting service consumers that require to only deal with services that are trustworthy. In service compositions, the component services may be mandatory or optional and vary in their contribution to the trustworthiness of the composite service. Composition techniques must be able to select trustworthy components and to dynamically adapt to subsequent changes in the services and the environment. The availability of multiple services providing the same or similar functionality but with different trustworthiness levels helps composite service providers to establish and maintain trustworthy compositions. The paper describes an approach to the aggregation of trustworthiness properties of composite services that are assembled from more fine-grained component services. The approach is developed for composite services based on BPMN business processes but can be extended to other languages.
I. Introduction
In service environments, services interact with each other and with their end users. Those environments are characterised by being dynamic, distributed, loosely coupled and open. The characteristics result in the possible existence of various levels of security, capacity, availability, reliability, and other functional and non-functional properties of the services operating in such environments. Consequently, it creates challenges for the interacting service consumers that require to only deal with services that are trustworthy especially with the likely lack of first hand knowledge in such environments.
Security mechanisms such as encryption and authentication are important steps in establishing trust. However, a secure service may not behave in the way it is required or expected in terms of reliability, availability, etc. Therefore, security mechanisms do not completely assure the behaviour of services. We define trust and trustworthiness as follows. Trust is a relationship between two or more entities that indicates the expectations from an entity towards another in relation to reliance in fulfilling some action at a certain quality and in a specific context. Trustworthiness of a service is the level of trust that a consumer or its agent has in that service. We classify data used to evaluate trustworthiness of composite services (CSs) into categories called trustworthiness properties.
The data provides metrics that indicate violations or adherence to service contracts. Several other works have also regarded trust as a multidimensional concept, such as in [1] - [4] .
Component services in a CS can be mandatory or optional components and may not all be equally important to the trustworthiness of the CS. For example, an e-commerce service may consist of several services such as product buying, insurance, credit service, etc. However, consumers may not value all those services to the same extent. Additionally, component services are executed in business processes which consist of different types of workflow constructs. This paper proposes an approach for aggregating the trustworthiness properties of CSs taking into account the variables discussed above which have not been considered in related work. The aggregation is based on the common structures of BPMN [5] business processes.
The paper extends our previous work [6] in relation to trustworthiness properties introduced thereby through adding additional properties namely uptime, execution time, and capacity. It also details the briefly introduced properties including security, reputation and reliability and the approach to importance weighting that affects the aggregation of reputation and capacity. The aggregation of CS security properties extends a novel approach to quantifying the security level of a CS. The paper has other novel aspects as well including the description of optional and mandatory CS components as well as the aggregation of component capacities that considers buffering and execution time constraints. It also provides customised techniques adequate to the characteristics of BPMN processes such as inclusive gateways.
Section II outlines related work. Section III discusses a motivating e-commerce composition scenario. Section IV describes properties that affect service trustworthiness. The structure of BPMN processes and component weights are discussed in Section V. Section VI explains the properties aggregation techniques and conclusions are described in Section VII.
II. Related Work
Past research work that covered aggregation of reputation in workflows either simply sum reputation ratings or take the average of the reputation of components. The inaccuracy of these approaches is evident because the dependency between components means the reputations of components affect each other. Additionally, no consideration is given to variation in the importance of the components. In [1] , Malik and Bouguettaya describe a collaborative model in which consumers share their experiences of service providers with their peers through ratings. Those ratings are in turn used to evaluate trust although the aggregation techniques of component service reputations are not detailed. Aggregation techniques for reputation and Quality of Service (QoS) in workflows are described by Hwang et al. [7] . However, the reputation of a workflow is regarded as sum of component reputations. Cardoso et al. [8] describe a model to aggregate a limited set of QoS properties. Meland [9] discusses an example of a situation where a component could affect the trustworthiness of a CS through service injection which justifies our approach to aggregation.
Singhal et al. [2] states that although trust is often used to refer to verifying the service identity, identity verification on its own is not enough to ensure trustworthiness since the service behaviour is not known. Takabi et al. [3] discuss the barriers and possible solutions to providing trustworthy services in cloud environments. They describe the need by providers to collaborate and compose enterprise services. They propose that a trust framework is needed to allow for establishing trust and to manage changing trust requirements. Jaquith describes [10] methods for quantifying security through metrics and approaches to the development of such metrics. Brucker et al. [11] describe a tool that aims to support the design-time modelling and runtime enforcement of security properties, e.g. separation of duties, for BPMN processes.
Our previous work [6] introduces a trustworthiness monitoring and prediction software module that receives data on service properties including QoS metrics, consumer ratings and security events. The data, which indicates violations or adherence to service contracts, is used to predict service trustworthiness. It also describes techniques for the optimisation of CSs' trustworthiness and cost using a genetic algorithm. The aggregation techniques described in this paper contribute to the mechanisms required by that software module for the prediction of trustworthiness levels of CSs. The techniques are also useful in maintaining trustworthiness at runtime using the monitored metrics such as dynamic component capacities. Fig. 1 shows an illustrative example using BPMN notations [5] for a CS in an e-commerce product purchasing scenario. The CS is offered to consumers by a provider. The CS contains nine abstract component services providing for the various process activities. The service labels are generally self-explanatory. For example, "Product Specification" is a service provided by a component provider for some categories of products. Consumers can choose to buy by credit payment service requiring other component services for loan, credit history and rate. Alternatively, the consumer can purchase the product through a debit payment. The component services are invoked affects the operation of the CS including the aggregation of its trustworthiness properties and consumer perception of its trustworthiness. The consumers may not value all the CS components to the same extent e.g. buying vs. insurance. Therefore, the component services contribute differently to the CS trustworthiness. The CS interacts with the consumers in a black-box fashion and the component services providers are invisible to the consumers. The CSs are implemented using a BPMN-based process with a Web front-end for the consumers that collects their data and submits it to the BPMN execution engine for processing the orders. An example of such engine is Activiti [12] ; a BPMN 2 process engine for Java. In our scenario, the engine provides interfaces to software modules that support process monitoring. The component services are monitored for their trustworthiness properties. Additionally, consumer ratings are provided after each transaction to indicate their perception of the CS trustworthiness.
III. Composite Service Scenario

IV. Trustworthiness Properties
In this paper we consider the following trustworthiness properties that can affect the overall trustworthiness of a CS:
• Security (s): includes a number of (sub)properties such as encryption, authentication, confidentiality and separation of duty. A security property σ i for a service v i is a boolean σ i ∈{0, 1} with 1 representing the fulfilment of the property and 0 for non-fulfilment. For example in encryption the fulfilment means the messages are securely encrypted with at least a minimum allowed key length. Those properties are aggregated to provide the CS security level s cs .
• Reliability (r): the rate of successful executions of a service without full or partial failures per total number of executions (0 ≤ r ≤ 1).
• Uptime (u): the percentage of time of availability of a service for the admission of requests over the total measurement time (0≤ u ≤1). Uptime is used as a metric of availability.
• Execution time (t): the execution time of a service is used as a a metric of performance. After aggregation of the component execution times, the CS execution time is measured against the requirement of the service contract. Execution time is also used in determining CS capacity.
• Capacity (y): is the number of executions that can be performed simultaneously. The aggregation of the capacity may result in an overall CS capacity that does not fulfil the requirements of the service contract. Not all components with limited capacity are untrustworthy but the CS provider requires to be aware in advance of the capacity limitations of the components. Moreover, high demand for a CS could be attributed to the high trustworthiness of its components. A CS provider with prior knowledge of the capacity limitations of a component can select an alternative or supplementary component providing the same functionality to protect the CS from becoming unavailable during peak usage.
• Reputation (p): the information about a service based on consumer satisfaction ratings. In this paper we consider the reputation as a value p where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
• Cost (c): monetary cost of a service may be considered a trustworthiness property such as in [13] . Anyhow, cost is an important factor in the optimisation of profitable CSs [6] .
V. Factors That Affect Aggregation
The aggregation of the trustworthiness properties depends on the characteristics of each property, the process structure, the probability of execution and on the importance of each component to the CS. Table I ):
A. Process Structure
• Sequence: Ordered consecutive execution of components.
• Synchronized Parallel (AND split/AND join): Two or more services are invoked in parallel and their outcome is synchronized. All services must be executed successfully for the next activity (service) to be executed.
• Loop: A service is invoked repeatedly till a condition is met.
We assume the number of iterations or average is known.
• Exclusive Choice (XOR Split/XOR join): A service is invoked instead of others if a condition is met. We assume that the likelihood of invocation of each services is known.
• Unsynchronized Parallel (AND split/OR join): Two or more services are executed in parallel but no synchronisation of the outcome of their execution. The next activity can commence as soon as one service is completed.
• Multi-choice with Synchronized Merge: Multiple services may be executed in parallel. Subsequent services can be begin execution when all executing branches are completed.
• Unordered Sequence: Services are executed sequentially but their order is insignificant. We use θ to denote a service construct in a composition. In BPMN, [5] AND join/split gateway is signified with '+', OR with ' ' and XOR with '×'. An empty gateway ' ' means it waits for one incoming branch before triggering the outgoing flow. Inclusive gateways ' ' are used to split and merge the process flow in Multi-Choice with Synchronized Merge.
B. Importance Weights of Components
Each component v i , in a CS with m components, is assigned a weight ω i indicating its importance to the CS trustworthiness ω i ∈ {ω 1 , ..., ω m } where 0 ≤ ω i ≤ m and
Note that Exclusive Choice components that provide the same functionality share the same weight. In order to differentiate between mandatory and optional components, a weight threshold Ω is set. A component service with w i <Ω is considered optional and can be excluded from consideration in the CS request admission decision and its execution when necessary. This can happen, for instance, due to the unavailability of the component. Optional components can be excluded from the aggregation of some trustworthiness properties such as capacity. The component weights are useful when the capacity of some components are in full usage or close to becoming so. In that case non-critical components can be excluded from the CS execution. This is particularly useful if the request would otherwise be rejected or when low remaining component resources can be saved for prioritised requests. Table I shows our functions for calculating the considered trustworthiness properties per service construct. The following discussion details the approaches for their aggregation. The aggregation of cost is straightforward as illustrated in the table. The aggregation of reputation and reliability were partly discussed in our previous work [6] but we include them for completeness and customisation to BPMN processes.
VI. Aggregation of the Properties
A. Security
Verification of the compliance of a service to the requirements or specification of a security property can be based on various mechanisms depending on the property considered. Codebased verification techniques are useful but may not always be sufficient. This is because the non-existence of a vulnerability does not mean that other related types of vulnerabilities exist and can result in a breach of a security property. Additionally, verification techniques are not always perfectly accurate or error-free. Finally, the verifiability also depends on the accurate definition and the granularity of the security property itself and various assumptions made, for example, in relation to the characteristics of data communicated from/to a service. Therefore, monitoring of security properties of CS and components is important as part of the enforcement and compliance checking strategy of those properties.
The aggregation of a security property of a composition uses the weakest link principle for all the CS components. Table I illustrates the aggregation for encryption as an example security property. Let σ k be a property among h evaluated (i.e. verified compliant/noncompliant) security properties of components of a CS; σ k ∈ {σ 1 , σ 2 , ..., σ h }. For a component v i the property σ k,i ∈{0, 1}. We calculate the property score for a CS with m components i.e. σ k,cs as:
To aggregate the values of all security properties in a composition and calculate the overall level of security (0 ≤ s cs ≤ 1) based on h properties we first take the weighted sumσ cs of the verified properties:σ
where γ k (γ k ≥0) is the weight for the property σ k,cs . It sets the effect of the property on the security level and trustworthiness. The value depends on multiple factors including the number of security properties considered, the priority of each property, potential resulting attack graphs in the CS and the likelihood of the related vulnerabilities being exploited. We propose the following formula for the level of security:
The value of γ k should meet the following requirements; (A) when all the CS security properties are fulfilled (i.e. h k=1 σ k,cs =h) Eq. (3) should result in a security level s cs ≈1, and (B) when a property that cannot be compromised is not fulfilled in the CS, s cs should fall below a preset security threshold e.g. 0.95. B. Reliability and Uptime Reliability and uptime aggregation is similar. For the sake of brevity, equations described for reliability in this section are also applicable to uptime. i) Sequence, Synchronized Parallel and Unordered Sequence:
A failure of a component causes failure of subsequent components. This is contrary to some other types of constructs such as Unsynchronized Parallel, where the next construct can be partially independent of the failure of the construct components and can be executed if a minimum set of components succeeds. Therefore, the reliability of these constructs is the product of that of its components. Similarly, the downtime of a mandatory component in these constructs results in the unavailability of the whole construct because of the dependency between the components.
ii) Loop: The reliability and uptime of a Loop with n iterations of a service v i is the same as a Sequence construct of n copies of v i i.e. r θ = r i n . iii) Exclusive Choice: The reliability and uptime of this construct is the sum of that of the exclusive components multiplied by their probabilities of execution in the CS. iv) Unsynchronized Parallel: Since an Unsynchronized Parallel construct only fails if all constituent services fail, its reliability (and similarly for uptime) is calculated as follows:
v) Multi-choice with Synchronized Merge: In each subset of components that may be executed in parallel, all its components must be executed successfully. Therefore, like in the case of reputation of this construct we sum the probabilities of each subset multiplied by the reliability of that subset. In a construct θ with a set S of components and two or more probable subsets of components that may be executed in parallel, its reliability is calculated as follows:
C. Execution Time i) Sequence and Unordered Sequence: In both of these constructs the execution time is summed to provide the total time of the construct execution; t θ = n i=1 t i . ii) Synchronized Parallel: The components are executed in parallel but the next construct can commence its execution until all parallel components are complete. Therefore, construct execution time equals that of the longest of its components' execution times i.e.
iii) Loop: The execution time of a loop is the number of executions by its component's execution time.
iv) Exclusive Choice: We use the execution probability-based weighted average of the components execution times as the construct's average execution time. v) Unsynchronized Parallel: The next construct starts once the first executing component in this construct completes. Therefore, the minimum of the components execution times is the construct execution time. vi) Multi-choice with Synchronized Merge: The execution time for each subset j with execution probability ρ j equals the longest of its components execution times. Subsequently, as in the Exclusive Choice we take the weighted average of the subsets' execution times.
D. Capacity i) Sequence, Synchronized Parallel and Unordered Sequence:
The capacity of each of these constructs equals the minimum capacity among its components when buffering is not taken into consideration.
ii) Loop: Since the same component is executed sequentially, the construct's capacity is the same of that of the component i.e. y θ = y i . iii) Exclusive Choice: The construct capacity is the execution probability-based weighted average of the capacities of exclusive components. iv) Unsynchronized Parallel: At least one component of this construct is required to be executed. Therefore, its capacity equals the maximum component's capacity.
v) Multi-choice with Synchronized Merge: All components in each subset j of the construct components with probability of execution ρ j must have the capacity to execute the CS. Therefore, the minimum of the subset component capacities is the subset capacity. The capacity of the construct is the total of product of the subset capacities by their probabilities. The capacity aggregation methods above do not describe how to consider buffering. The buffering maximises the usage of the components capacities and significantly increases the capacity of the CS. The admitted CS requests must be executed within allowed execution timet according to, for instance, a service level agreement. In order to admit a request to the queue the capacity of at least one of the CS components at the time of its execution (taking execution durations of preceding components into account) must be fully in use. Additionally, the queue for all components must be less than the queue threshold Q cs of the requested CS. The threshold depends on the allowed CS execution timet, its actual execution duration t cs and the capacities of the CS constructs as follows:
Q cs = y cs · (t − t cs ) t (11) where y cs is the weighted average capacity of sequential constructs in the CS. The weight of each construct is its execution time. The minimum capacity of components of a 
c i n= no. of construct components, ρ i = probability of execution of component v i , ρ j = probability of execution of subset j of construct components Synchronized Parallel is the capacity of the construct as in Table I , and so on for other constructs with simultaneously running components. Subsequently, the weighted average of resulting sequential construct capacities is taken as the CS capacity that includes buffering. E. Reputation i) Sequence, Synchronized Parallel and Unordered Sequence:
The reputation is calculated as a product of that of components taking the importance weights into consideration:
ii) Loop: The reputation of a Loop with n iterations of a service v i is the same as a Sequence of n copies of v i i.e. p i n·ω i . iii) Exclusive Choice: Each service v i among the alternatives has a probability ρ i that it will be executed where n i=1 ρ i = 1. We aggregate the construct reputation as the sum of the weighted component reputations multiplied by their probabilities.
iv) Unsynchronized Parallel: Since all component services are executed, the reputation takes all services into consideration as in Eq. (12). v) Multi-choice with Synchronized Merge: In this construct, the execution of each subset j of all possible subsets of the set S of construct services ( j ⊂ S ) is associated with a probability ρ j that it will be executed where j⊂S ρ j = 1. The construct reputation considers both the probability of execution and weight of the components:
VII. Conclusion This paper has presented an approach to the aggregation of trustworthiness properties in BPMN-based composite services.
The values of the trustworthiness properties are measured against the adherence of the services to their contracts. The aggregation methods depend on the characteristics of the property, the structure of the process and the importance weight of the CS components.
